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By being part of the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme, it was thought that UK firms would
have increased incentives to decarbonise, spurring technological innovation. Raphael Calel
and Antoine Dechezleprêtre  argue that this is not the case. Their research indicates that
the scheme has thus far failed to encourage companies as was intended; there is little
difference in patenting rates for low carbon technologies between countries that are and are
not part of the scheme. While low-carbon innovation is up, it is not because of the EU ETS.
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was launched in 2005 and is
today the world’s largest carbon market, covering roughly 40 per cent of  the EU’s total
greenhouse gas emissions. It is the main instrument of  European climate change policy,
and many policy makers envisage it as a driving f orce of  the EU’s transit ion to a low-
carbon economy. By putting a price on greenhouse gas emissions, the Scheme is
expected to encourage heavy polluters to reduce their emissions and to develop new
low-carbon technologies. At f irst glance, it is encouraging to notice, then, that patenting
f or low-carbon technologies has surged in Europe since 2005. However, when analysing a newly
constructed data set we f ind compelling evidence that the EU ETS cannot explain this surge, and so f ar
has f ailed to encourage companies to develop new low-carbon technologies.
A surge in low-carbon innovation
A substantial theoretical and empirical literature argues that when companies become subject to a new
environmental regulation, they will direct additional resources toward developing new technologies that
reduce their emissions of  the regulated substance. The EU ETS launched in 2005, so is there any
evidence of  an increase in low-carbon innovation?
Figure 1: Share of  low-carbon patents (1978-2009) 
Figure 1 shows that the share of  patents f iled at the European Patent Of f ice to protect low-carbon
technologies has varied between 1 and 2 per cent over the past three decades. Looking at the share
helps us take account of  the rising total number of  patents has over t ime. A sharp increase in the share
is visible starting in 2005. Could this be due to the EU ETS?
Carbon prices or oil prices?
This preliminary evidence provides grounds f or optimism, but other f actors might explain the surge in
low-carbon innovation. One candidate is higher oil prices. When f ossil f uels become more expensive
companies may try to develop new technological solutions that reduce their f uel use, and hence their
carbon emissions. Figure 2 shows that the surge in low-carbon innovation has indeed f ollowed on the
heels of  rapidly rising oil prices. How can we determine whether the surge is a result of  the higher oil
prices, the EU ETS, or some other change occurring in the early 2000s?
To be, or not to be. . . regulated
The EU ETS now regulates the emissions of  around 11,000 power stations and industrial plants in 30
countries. Several thousand companies own and operate these installations, but there are many more
companies that are not directly af f ected by the Scheme. To separate the impact of  the EU ETS f rom
other f actors that might explain the surge in low-carbon innovation, we can compare companies covered
by the EU ETS with those that are not.
Figure 2: Share of  low-carbon patents and Crude oil price (1978-2009)
Using a newly constructed data set, we can compare a group of  over 700 companies that -by virtue of
operating at least one suf f iciently large installation – came under EU ETS regulations in 2005, with a
group of  roughly 1,000 comparable companies that were exempted. Bef ore 2005, these two groups of
companies were similar in size, in patenting activit ies, and operated in the same countries and economic
sectors. Both groups would have f aced similar macroeconomic conditions (e.g. oil prices) throughout the
period. But starting in 2005 they f aced dif f erent regulatory obligations f or their greenhouse gas
emissions.
Figure 3: Share of  low-carbon patents f or EU ETS and non-EU ETS companies (2000-2009)
Figure 3 shows the share of  low-carbon patents f or these two groups of  companies in the f ive years
prior to the EU ETS launch and the f ive years since. The f irms look roughly similar over the period 2000-
2004. The pattern has also been much the same across the two groups since 2005 – if  anything, it looks
as though the response has been greatest among the non-EU ETS f irms. When we take account of  the
dif f erent starting level in 2005, however, we notice that the shares of  low-carbon patents f iled by the
two groups have risen by a similar multiple. More sophisticated statistical estimation procedures conf irm
this basic f inding – since 2005 low-carbon patenting has developed in much the same way among
comparable EU ETS and non-EU ETS companies.
Low-carbon innovation is up, but not because of the EU ETS
On the f ace of  it, there could be a number of  explanations f or this f inding, only one of  which is that the
EU ETS so f ar has f ailed to encourage companies to develop new low-carbon technologies. We
investigated a number of  causal and technical explanations – looking at the patent f ilings f rom an
additional 2,000 EU ETS regulated companies that could not be successf ully compared in the f irst
instance, looking at patenting by unregulated competitors, patenting by third-party technology suppliers,
biases arising f rom study design and omissions of  important control variables, etc.. While it is not always
possible to conclusively rule on these hypotheses, we f ind evidence that none of f er a compelling
alternative. We are lef t to conclude that, while low-carbon innovation is up, it is not because of  the EU
ETS.
The EU ETS f orms an integral part of  the European Union’s roadmap to a low-carbon economy in 2050.
Moreover, policy makers in the process of  implementing new carbon market programs in New Zealand,
the North-Eastern United States, Australia, and elsewhere, can learn f rom the EU ETS experience.
Emissions reductions in past emissions trading programs like the US Acid Rain Program have come
largely f rom operational rather than technological changes, and the same appears to have happened with
the EU ETS. New low-carbon technologies are needed, but our f indings suggest that the EU ETS in its
current f orm might not be enough to incentivise low-carbon technological change.
At this point we can only speculate about the reasons f or this f ailure. Many have argued the EU ETS
would not encourage innovation because it has provided overly generous allocation of  emissions
permits, and awarded permits to polluters f ree of  charge. Future changes to the rules of  the EU ETS may
provide opportunit ies to answer these specif ic charges. To the extent that these f actors account f or our
f indings, however, there are relatively clear policy implications – tighten the emissions cap and/or sell
permits instead of  giving them away f ree. The current move to set aside permits, as well as the increased
reliance on auctions to distribute permits in the third trading phase, would in these cases appear to be
moves in the right direction.
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